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Abstract: On a global scale, programmes of social protection for the poor are becoming increasingly 
computerised, and architectures of biometric recognition are being widely used in this respect. This 
paper seeks to illuminate how these architectures, inscribed in anti-poverty systems, structure ways to 
“see the state” for citizens living in poverty. To do so I study India’s Public Distribution System (PDS) 
in Kerala, a state that is augmenting its main food security scheme with the biometric recognition of its 
users. In government’s narrative, biometric technology is depicted as an optimal solution to the illicit 
diversion of PDS goods on the market. At the same time, through the multiple narratives collected 
across the state, beneficiaries are found to dispute this view in different ways, based on the mixed 
effects of the new technology on their entitlements under the PDS. The state’s capability to 
reconstruct its image, through the means of digital innovation, is hence found to be constrained by the 
perceptions derived by citizens in their encounters with the new technology of governance. 
 
 
Keywords: Asia, India, Food Security, Public Distribution System, Biometric Technologies, Social 
Policy  
1. Introduction 
 
Social protection has emerged as a core theme in contemporary studies of development policy and 
governance. The notion of social safety nets encompasses all the schemes protecting the poor and 
vulnerable from food insecurity, unemployment, lack of sustainable livelihoods, and all the problems 
that the condition of poverty entails. As of Sen (1981), social safety nets are instrumental in liberating 
the poor from the “substantial unfreedoms” that threaten the quality of their lives, as they provide the 
means to combat poverty at its very basis. These programmes are the epitome of social protection, 
and there is a growing sense that they can offer an effective response to poverty and exclusion on a 
global scale (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009; Devereux & Vincent, 2010; Gelb & Decker; 2011). 
 
Over the last few years, social safety nets worldwide have become increasingly automatised, and 
computerised through mechanisms that theories of the state per se do not fully contemplate. These 
mechanisms belong to the domain of information technology (IT) innovation, and refer in particular to 
biometric architectures, which perform user authentication on the basis of biological data. In anti-
poverty programmes, biometrics are key to enforcing targeted systems of access, as the uniqueness 
of biological data should ensure reservation to genuinely entitled users. However, the change brought 
by these technologies goes beyond reconstruction of the state-citizen interface: by reconfiguring 
access to anti-poverty nets, IT innovation contributes to their reform, and ultimately affects the social 
policies in which the lives of poor citizens are inscribed (Sarkar, 2014). 
 
It is hence important to study how biometric technologies reshape citizens’ access to the state, 
rebuilding the image that is conveys through anti-poverty programmes (Corbridge, Srivastava, 
Williams, & Véron, 2005). More specifically, two processes should be observed: first, a process of 
image construction by the state, using digital innovation to create a public impression of accountability 
and effectiveness. Second, a process of image perception by citizens, who “see the state” through a 
new generation of computerised social safety nets. Both processes are researched here.  
 
This paper studies an old anti-poverty programme, the Public Distribution System (PDS), as it has 
been redesigned through biometric recognition in India, with a focus on the southern state of Kerala. 
The PDS is the oldest, widest food security net in India, consisting in subsidisation of primary 
necessity goods received by poorer households in monthly rationed quotas. In the PDS supply chain, 
procurement by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) is followed by redistribution at several 
administrative levels, before items reach the fair-price shops where they are accessed by 
beneficiaries. Faced with a problem of leakage, Kerala introduced a set of innovations, culminating in 
the ongoing switch to user identification under the Unique Identity Project (Aadhaar), aimed to identify 
every Indian resident through a unique 12-digit number and the capture of biometric details. 
 
Across eight months in 2011-2012, I have conducted an interpretive case study of the PDS in Kerala, 
using a qualitative method of data collection and analysis. My main data set consists of 126 in-depth 
interviews with actors governing the digital PDS (software developers, government officials and 
program officers), its users (PDS beneficiaries), and actors revolving around the system in different 
ways (local politicians, right-to-food activists, volunteers at pro-poor organisations, et similia). I have 
used narrative analysis of interviews’ contents (Riessman, 2008) as the main tool to qualitatively 
reconstruct causal processes, and integrated interview data with participant observation in the ration 
shops, telecentres, and Taluk Supply Offices adopting the digital PDS.1 Following the case study 
method (Yin, 2009), primary data have been triangulated with statistics, press releases, and 
government documents on the PDS and its digital transformation. 
 
Data analysis has led me to elicit processes of construction and perception of the state’s image, 
mediated through the biometrically transformed PDS. In terms of image construction, biometric control 
is framed, in governmental narratives, as the ideal solution to the problem of “rice mafia”, consisting in 
the systematic diversion of goods from the PDS to the private market by illicit means. Jos Mooij 
(1999) represents the PDS as a key tool of electoral politics, as state governments use a well-
functioning food security system to portray themselves as effective and accountable. The process I 
elicit, with respect to the e-PDS, extends Mooij’s argument to biometric technology, which is 
constructed as a key component of the solution to the programme’s leakage. 
 
At the same time though, the extent to which this process affects citizens’ perception of the state is 
limited. It is found that citizens, in receiving self-reconstructed images of the state, re-elaborate them 
through the perceived effects of technology on their entitlements under the PDS. Aadhaar’s biometric 
architecture is read in multiple ways by PDS users: their views are influenced by the exclusionary 
effects of biometric recognition, the perceived limitation of e-PDS to ration shop monitoring, and most 
importantly its role in preparing the shift to a cash transfers system, regarded with suspicion by many 
beneficiaries. All these narratives seem to reveal that the state’s capability of image-building through 
technology is constrained by the perceptions derived by citizens in their encounters with the PDS.  
 
My work aims at expanding seminal theory on the anthropology of the everyday state to account for 
the inclusion of digital, and especially biometric, architectures in the state-citizen interface. A new 
generation of anti-poverty programmes, dominated by biometric recognition, is pervading the 
developing world, and the ways in which political society is disciplined will be deeply influenced by its 
advent. In this perspective, the paper aims to elicit the core mechanisms of transformation, relying on 
the construct of the image (meant as subjective knowledge, as in Boulding, 1956) as a tool for 
examining the dynamics at work. Newly computerised technologies of rule deserve particular attention 
when it comes to their effects on anti-poverty practice. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details Corbridge et al.’s perspective on anti-poverty 
programmes as technologies of rule, and augments it through the prospective role of biometric 
                                                          
1 Taluks are sub-district administrative units in Kerala. A Taluk Supply Office is the bureau in charge of local 
administration of the PDS and other government schemes. 
architectures in transforming social safety schemes. Section 3 presents the case of the PDS, in terms 
of both the old technology of rule and the new digital artefact that is transforming it in Kerala. Section 
4, based on data analysis, elicits the process of IT-induced image reconstruction by the state. The 
analysis is then continued in Section 5, where citizens’ processes of perception of the state through 
different loci of image formation are observed. Conclusions, and implications for expansion of existing 
theory, are drawn in Section 6. 
 
 
2. “Seeing the State” through Technologies of Rule 
 
The idea of “Seeing the State” is a reversal of “Seeing Like a State”, Scott’s (1998) view that high 
modernist states would produce citizens by inscribing them in classifiable categories, making them 
amenable to biopolitical control. In a reversed perspective, Corbridge et al. (2005) detail how citizens, 
rather than being seen and classified, actively see the state in its physical manifestations. The heart 
of the theory lies in an anthropology of the everyday state (Benei & Fuller, 2001): citizens do not 
conceive of the state through indirect projections, but through the embodiments (bureaucrats, village 
officers, local agencies) that they encounter in their daily lives. This represents a rupture with the 
Weberian vision of a ‘”faceless” bureaucracy, as encounters with the officers and agencies in which 
the state is embodied are real and personalised. 
 
These encounters are often frustrating and sometimes violent for the poor in India (Corbridge et al., 
2005, p. 3). This is partially because most of the poor inhabit, as of Chatterjee (2004), the “rough and 
tumble” worlds of political society, where frustration is frequent in interactions with bureaucracy. 
Chatterjee’s dichotomy, between a civil society of equals and a subaltern political society, is 
epitomised by India today: whereas richer elites inhabit the former, the latter encompasses the poorer 
masses, excluded from most forms of participation in their own development.2 In this domain, the poor 
can “see the state” only dimly, through the practices of often corrupt officials. 
 
Still, encounters with the state are far from being unstructured. Over time, India has developed a host 
of anti-poverty programmes, highly needed to maintain appeal on the “dangerous classes” (Corbridge 
& Srivastava, 2013). Anti-poverty programmes, ranging from food security to employment generation, 
inscribe citizens into observable categories (caste, poverty status, et similia): in doing so, they go far 
beyond the sheer mechanism of poverty alleviation. In performing the developmental function of the 
state (Williams, Srivastava, Corbridge, & Véron, 2003), they act as technologies of rule, as they 
provide a way to advance state control through the means of governmentality. 
 
The concept of technologies of rule refers to all institutions, practices, and classification techniques 
through which government is performed (Rose, 1999). Within theories of the everyday state, this 
                                                          
2 While Chatterjee suggests that “civil society and the poor coexist in India like oil and water” (cited in Corbridge 
et al., 2005, p. 3), Corbridge et al. point to a “sea-change” in contemporary Indian politics, based on the more 
participatory character of the most recent anti-poverty schemes. 
notion has a particular connotation: as it emerges from Corbridge et al. (2005), technologies of rule 
result from the conflation of policy principles with the governmental apparatus enacting them. The 
concept is predicated on the Foucauldian idea that government is explicated in a set of disciplining 
techniques, resulting in the indivisible unit of governing rationality with the tools and practices through 
which it comes alive (Foucault, 2007). As a result, we refer to technologies of rule to indicate the unity 
of policy principles with the physical instruments that translate them into practice.   
 
Social safety schemes, studied in Corbridge et al. (2005), are the core technology of rule to which the 
poor are subjected in contemporary India. They result from integration of a policy rationale, aimed at 
protecting the poor from the vulnerabilities of their condition, and a set of physical measures, 
translating this in the practices of government described above. The heart of the theory lies in the 
view that these programmes pervade the everyday lives of the poor, and structure their encounters 
with the government: rather than as an abstract entity, “the state” is met through the agents of anti-
poverty policy, ranging from mediators of employment guarantees to sellers supplying food rations in 
the villages. Anti-poverty programmes structure the encounters through which the poor “see” the 
state, and are thus the core device through which their images of the state are formed. 
 
What is not contemplated by theories of the state, and needs attention in current scholarship, is the 
computerisation that anti-poverty programmes are undertaking at a global level. The digitisation of 
social safety nets is taking diverse shapes: cash transfer schemes, formerly based on the physical 
delivery of envelopes, are shifting to mobile money (Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, & Tierney, 2015; 
Devereux & Vincent, 2010). Programmes of emergency assistance, such as cash transfers to 
households affected by drought, are increasingly automatising their functions (Gelb & Decker, 2011; 
Vincent & Cull, 2011). Employment guarantee nets, based on secure recognition of workers, are 
moving to biometric identification (Bhatti, 2012; Muralidharan, Niehaus, & Sukhtankar, 2014). All 
these programmes have long been into place, yet new technologies are rebuilding their structures, 
yielding consequences on the relation between the state and its beneficiaries. 
 
Diverse streams of ICT for Development (ICT4D) literature have dealt with this phenomenon. Some 
look at the benefits of computerisation on programme delivery: digitisation is expected to help save 
time and increase the security of cash transfers (Aker et al., 2015). The same tools are functional in 
reducing leakage, hence acting as means to greater accountability of the state (Bhatti, 2012; 
Muralidharan et al., 2014). Discussion of benefits is juxtaposed to reflection on the issues involved, 
since these systems are prone to political manipulation, information capture, and invisible costs to the 
user (Devereux & Vincent, 2010). But the general perspective, with a note of caution for the problems 
in point, is that technology yields potential to build better and more reliable anti-poverty schemes. 
 
Another stream of scholarship goes beyond expected benefits, and focuses on the relation between 
technology and the context of implementation. The idea that “artefacts have politics” (Winner, 1980) is 
the core concept here, stating that technology acts as an embodiment of the political visions behind it, 
and should hence be conceived in terms of political effects rather than of its materiality alone 
(Cordella & Iannacci, 2010). Computerisation is seen in terms of the policy objectives that it enacts, 
and interacts with context by advancing specific visions of social policy design. This shifts the focus 
on the political genesis of computerisation, and on the meaning of development that technology 
brings into the programmes it helps redesigning (Prakash & De, 2007). 
 
These ideas have long characterised information systems scholarship, and are now being applied to 
automatisation of anti-poverty programmes. Veeraraghavan (2015) studies computerisation of a large 
workfare scheme as a means of surveillance, which advances a top-down view of control on workers. 
Masiero and Prakash (2015) trace links between a digital food security scheme and the policy of 
narrow targeting embedded in it. Carswell and De Neve (2013) study how “technologies” in the broad 
sense (including cards, documents and the like) reveal people’s everyday interactions with the state 
as embedded in relations of power, subordination and agency. The question here is not anymore on 
benefits, but on the politics advanced by computerisation, and its effects on beneficiaries. 
 
Another stream focuses on the policy effects of biometric systems, whose presence in the domain of 
social protection has increased over the last decades. In biometric technologies, data capture (usually 
involving fingerprints and/or iris scans) allows unique authentication exactly because of the biological 
nature of data. This function is the root of the technology’s relevance to social safety: secure 
authentication, whose accountability is enhanced by the uniqueness of biological data, enforces the 
targeted nature of programmes, allowing access to those entitled and excluding all others from 
appropriation. In systems where corruption and leakage are problematic, biometric devices are 
particularly helpful in identifying entitled users (Gelb & Decker, 2011; Muralidharan et al., 2014). 
 
The material features of biometrics should hence allow to exclude fake beneficiaries, and reach the 
poor and needful in a more reliable way. Yet, the enforcement of barriers to access may come without 
means to ensure inclusion of the many households that, while needful, still do not see their benefits 
acknowledged (Khera, 2014; Ramakumar, 2010). While the association with anti-poverty objectives 
has increased the public legitimation of biometric systems (Srinivasan & Johri, 2013), many complain 
about the exclusionary effects of the same architectures in social safety practice. In this debate, the 
consensus is that biometric technologies are enacting deep transformation, which is changing the 
face and substance of anti-poverty schemes worldwide. 
 
It hence needs to be asked, what are the consequences of reconstructing anti-poverty programmes 
through biometric devices? Most importantly, new technologies participate in people’s sightings of the 
state, in terms of both the state’s construction of itself and its perception by citizens (Kuriyan & Ray, 
2009). The advent of biometrics, and more at large the pervasive change that digital technologies 
imply, led me to investigate construction and perception of the state’s public image through these 
technologies. To do so, I needed long-term engagement with a practical instance, in which an old 
anti-poverty programme (the Indian PDS) was being reconstructed by a biometric infrastructure. 
  
3. Kerala: The Aadhaar-Led Reconstruction of the PDS 
 
The PDS supply chain, providing primary necessity goods (mainly rice, wheat, sugar and kerosene) at 
subsidised prices to the Indian poor, has three main phases. Firstly, goods procured from the FCI and 
private producers are distributed at the district level through Authorised Wholesale Dealers (AWDs), 
who store them in dedicated warehouses known as godowns. Goods are then lifted from the local 
AWD by fair-price shop owners, who collect them on a monthly basis for redistribution to programme 
recipients. Finally, beneficiaries buy subsidised goods from fair-price shops, known as “ration shops” 
as commodities are sold in monthly rationed quotas. The difference between PDS and market prices 
should allow poorer households to afford the goods required to cover their basic nutritional needs.   
 
As in Corbridge et al. (2005), the ration shop is the physical space of access to the PDS, and 
constitutes a core locus of image formation processes. In the shop, citizens encounter the state in the 
form of ration dealers, the agents selling them subsidised food items. This exemplifies the 
“anthropology of the everyday state” illustrated above: the state is met in the form of the ration dealers 
who allow people’s access to the PDS, and (as detailed below) sometimes constrain it by failing to 
provide rations. Encounters with them, whether well-functioning or ridden with frustration, hence play 
a major role in poorer people’s sightings of the state. 
 
The PDS was originally universal, meaning that all citizens could have access to it. Yet in the fiscal 
crisis of the 1990s, international funding institutions criticised the scheme for its universal coverage, 
resulting in “meagre transfer at exorbitant cost” (Radakrishna & Subbarao, 1997, p. 72). This was at 
the root of the nation’s move to a targeted system in 1997: in the targeted PDS, entitlement is related 
to poverty status, and aimed to the households termed as below the state-specific poverty lines.  The 
policy shift determined a set of mixed effects, of which the case of Kerala is paradigmatic. 
 
Before 1997, Kerala operated the best PDS in India (Khera, 2011a; Swaminathan, 2002). Under the 
universal system, it catered to 97% of the state’s population (George, 1979, p. 23), and its impact on 
beneficiaries’ nutritional status was high and significant (Kumar, 1979). This was very relevant in a 
state whose food-deficit situation, per se, would put people’s nutritional security in peril. The 
philosophy behind the Keralite system was based on the universality of the right to food, and on the 
need to translate it in a programme capable of serving all households in need of support.3 
 
However, the shift to targeting in 1997 caused major ruptures in the scheme. The new system, 
allocating goods to each state based on poverty incidence, reduced supply of PDS goods to Kerala to 
less than 10% of the pre-targeting amount (Swaminathan, 2002, p. 51). In parallel, users termed as 
                                                          
3 Historically, Kerala witnessed a socioeconomic transition from below, in which peasants played a key role in 
subverting feudal relations of power. Subsequent governments’ consideration for redistributive policies has 
fostered the construction of a well-functioning PDS. 
above-poverty-line (APL) were de facto phased out, as they were subjected to only very limited 
subsidy on food.4 As a result of the drop in their customer base, many ration shops had to close, 
which concurred to causing a wave of suicides among ration dealers (Suchitra, 2004). 
 
One of the problems resulting from post-targeting dynamics is that of leakage, which is severe at the 
national level too. As commodities flow from FCI and private producers to ration shops, a high share 
of goods is lost in the process, mainly due to illegal sales on the private market. This phenomenon, 
popularly known as rice mafia (rice is the staple commodity in the PDS), may put the whole 
programme at risk, and its persistence is the core argument by the programme’s detractors (Bhalla, 
2011; Gulati & Saini, 2015). Yet, leakage has triggered reforms at the state level, which in several 
cases have been successful (Drèze & Khera, 2015; Himanshu, 2013). 
 
In Kerala the digitisation of PDS, delegated to the National Informatics Centre (NIC), has been at the 
core of the programme’s reconstruction. Computerisation was conceived to monitor the PDS supply 
chain, hence detecting and preventing foodgrain diversion. Government officials, and the NIC staff 
that I have followed during implementation, were adamant on the anti-leakage nature of the effort, and 
the IT-based PDS was built to detect diversion through digital monitoring. To achieve this purpose, 
reconstruction of the programme was phased in two parts, a first one in which infrastructure was built 
and a second one, still ongoing, in which it is being augmented with Aadhaar’s biometric recognition. 
 
In the first phase, NIC developed a suite of software articulated in three modules, out of which a front-
end one involving citizens, and two back-end ones used by staff at Taluk Supply Offices (TSOs). The 
front-end interface consisted in a Ration Card Management System (RCMS), a workflow-based 
application for ration card requests: once received through the registration counter, applications are 
verified by rationing inspectors, who then submit them to the TSO for approval. Applications are 
performed through Akshaya centres, the telecentres (public-private Internet kiosks) operating across 
the state. This has partially shifted the locus of image formation, from the busy public offices where 
applications were originally made to more citizen-centric e-kiosks (Madon, 2005). 
 
The two back-end functions pertain, respectively, to allocation of goods and inspection of the ration 
shops in the state. Through a programme named Allocation 2.0, TSOs can ascertain the requirement 
of each ration dealer in their area, and allocate PDS goods to them consequently. As a result, all 
shops should have enough stock to deliver monthly rations to all households registered with them. 
Another application, called an Inspection Monitoring System, is a database of inspections conducted 
by officers in all ration shops, to combat the illicit trade of PDS commodities.  
 
                                                          
4 In Kerala, as in most Indian states (with the exception of Tamil Nadu, which maintained a universal PDS), the 
move to a targeted system resulted in the dichotomy between the APL, left with a very limited subsidy, and the 
BPL households, for whom the subsidy remains substantial. In 2000, the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) scheme 
was introduced, for the poorest of the poor to receive greater quantities of subsidised foodgrains. 
But it is the second phase of digitisation, aimed at rebuilding state-citizen encounters in the ration 
shops, that affects the beneficiaries most visibly. This phase involves integrating PDS with Aadhaar, 
the unique identification system devised by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).5 The 
Aadhaar project aims at solving identification issues, by endowing each Indian resident with a 12-digit 
number and registered biometric details (fingerprints and an iris scan). Massively high rates (above 
95%) of Aadhaar enrolment in Kerala make it technically possible to use it for access to anti-poverty 
schemes, and a pilot project in Trivandrum has started this phase: a set of ration shops have been 
endowed with point-of-sale machines, performing Aadhaar identification to ascertain users’ 
entitlement to the PDS.  
 
Interviews with government officials and NIC software developers have revealed the policy rationale 
behind this measure. A frequent practice of ration dealers is that of attaching bogus cards, whose 
number is not registered in the system, to their shops. By registering sales to fake users as real, they 
can mask illegal sales to the market, and make their activity appear normal in the registers checked 
by the inspectors. Biometric recognition, by linking each user to its own biometric details, ensures that 
sales are only made to real beneficiaries, as all transactions need to be matched by a valid Aadhaar 
number. This implies a twofold accountability mechanism: non-genuine beneficiaries are excluded 
from subsidy, and ration dealers are prevented from selling goods to non-entitled users.  
 
This is the rationale at the root of the biometric PDS. In the effort of computerising the PDS, biometric 
authentication involves the last mile of the supply chain, and the ration shop’s technology is 
reconstructed in the process. An old anti-poverty programme, such as the PDS, is thereby subjected 
to the principles of biometrics, and the space in which this reconstruction occurs is the same in which 
citizens form their images of the state. This has enabled me to focus on the construction and 
perception of the state’s image, as reproduced by these new technologies. 
 
 
4. Biometric PDS: The Self-Reconstruction of the State 
 
Narrative analysis conducted at the government level has allowed me to focus on the biometric PDS 
as a means to reconstruction of the state’s public image. Mooij (1999) illustrates how the programme 
is used as a means to recast the image of the state, with governments enhancing their popularity 
through well-functioning PDS infrastructures. An effective food security system is used as a means to 
political appeal, and as digital technology is now applied to anti-poverty systems, an image-building 
role for it needs to be explored.  
 
In the narratives collected from government officers, and from NIC staff in charge of PDS 
computerisation, I have found a twofold mechanism of IT-based reconstruction of the state’s image. 
                                                          
5 In September 2013, an order by the Supreme Court of India has forbidden states to make enrolment in social 
programs conditional to Aadhaar registration. However in March 2016, a new order has reversed the previous 
one, providing legal backing to the use of Aadhaar in anti-poverty programmes. 
One side of it has been briefly illustrated above: the front-end side of e-PDS has been moved from 
public offices to Akshaya telecentres, the e-kiosks distributed across the entire state. The Akshaya 
project is a public-private partnership in which private entrepreneurs, known and integrated in the 
local community, manage e-kiosks that provide all kinds of government services, ranging from bill 
payments to applications for social security schemes. By moving ration card applications to the 
Akshaya network, the government has shifted the locus of image formation to a trusted space, away 
from the public offices in which the poor are often neglected or mistreated (Gopakumar, 2007). 
 
And yet, there is another side to the mechanism of self-reconstruction enacted by the state. This 
consists in the construction of a problem-solution nexus, i.e. a logical link between a problem and its 
solution, flowing from the root cause of PDS leakage to the technology devised to fight it. Identifying 
this link requires analysis of two narrative streams, both recurrent in government officers’ speech: one 
revolves around the problem, depicted as centred on ration dealers’ involvement in the rice mafia. 
The other is about the solution, and portrays the biometric PDS as the best way to tackle the problem. 
  
Government staff is unanimous in recognising leakage as a serious problem, and in acknowledging its 
consequences on the food security system. As noted by the former Collector of Rationing, 
 
Kerala is known to have one of the best PDS in India, but it is still very corrupted (…) prices are higher on 
the market, so there is an incentive to sell [PDS goods] there.  
 
The root cause of leakage is recognised in the rice mafia, to which practically all diversion from the 
system is attributed. While losses in transportation and storage are sometimes acknowledged, 
leakage is blamed on the black market networks, on which BPL rice is sold for much higher prices 
than on the PDS. This generates a gap in the system, which makes the poor systematically unable to 
access the food items to which they are entitled. 
 
A core question is on which actors are actually involved in the rice mafia, as long supply chains may 
make it hard to determine responsibility for diversion. Blame is attributed quasi-unanimously on ration 
dealers: very often, ration shop customers are turned down, with the excuse that the shop has “run 
out” of stock. Government officials are adamant on ration dealers’ responsibility: 
 
In Kerala there are many bogus cards, which copy existing ones or invent households that do not exist 
(…) it is the ration dealers that fabricate bogus cards, not the customers. So, they can pretend having sold 
goods to the BPL, when instead they have sold them elsewhere. (Rationing Inspector, Trivandrum) 
 
To be sure, ration dealers have been put in a dire position by the central government’s shift to a 
targeted PDS. As noted above, targeting has forced many ration shops to shut down, and left the 
remaining ones at serious risk of unviability. This has been a factor pushing many of them into market 
diversion: as in Khera (2011a, p. 1058), corruption has become a “requirement of economic survival” 
for many fair-price shop owners. This point is corroborated by the voices of ration dealers, whose 
narratives of struggle for business viability are explored in greater detail below. 
 
A second thread of narrative revolves around the solution, embodied in integration of Aadhaar in the 
PDS. This is articulated into three mechanisms, all embedded in the Aadhaar system. 
 
The first mechanism lies in secure identification of PDS users. As noted above, the main means for 
ration dealers to divert foodgrains is based on bogus cards registered in the shops, which mask illegal 
sales to the black market. By linking each card to the biological data of the owner, biometrics will 
make this virtually impossible, as point-of-sale machines require recognition of users’ fingerprints to 
allow transactions. As reported by a member of staff at the Kerala State IT Mission (KSITM):  
 
Ration cards have barcodes (…) often they are copied, and ration dealers claim false sales as a result. 
With Aadhaar, there is no risk of this, because control will be biometric. 
 
Yet, this would per se be insufficient, if the e-PDS did not provide a way to check that all transactions 
conducted by ration dealers happen through point-of-sale machines. The second mechanism stems 
from the fact that, beyond checking the identity of buyers, point-of-sale machines register exactly the 
amount of goods sold at every transaction. This makes it possible to determine the requirement of 
each shop, and to allocate them commodities on a monthly basis.6 This leaves no room for “inventing” 
sales, as noted by another official at KSITM: 
 
The system will reveal what goods are sold, and to whom. Ration dealers (…) claim that stocks have 
finished, and sell them on the market. But now, the system will be able to track exactly who buys what. 
 
A third mechanism acts on the incentive for ration dealers to cheat on their customers, by pretending 
having run out of goods – or selling them at prices higher (or quantities lower) than PDS. At present, 
all households are registered with a ration shop, and cannot decide to opt out of it in case that 
irregular behaviour is suspected. Aadhaar is instead constructed to imply “portability” of the system, 
as biometric authentication can be performed from everywhere. As a NIC officer noted: 
 
Ration dealers will be unable to count on their usual customers, because people will be able to buy [PDS] 
food from everywhere (…) they won’t be able to compete if they continue their cheating. 
 
These mechanisms, attached to the integration of Aadhaar in the programme, complete the narrative 
used by the government to recast its image through the e-PDS. This is a carefully designed problem-
solution nexus, in which attribution of guilt to ration dealers is matched by a threefold system to 
prevent them from diverting foodgrains. From this narrative, the state emerges as a self-constructed 
problem solver, concerned with devising “the right technology” to combat diversion of goods to the 
                                                          
6 The monthly bill, summing up all transactions conducted through Aadhaar, is the basis on which allocation for 
the subsequent month is provided. 
market. This turns an old technology of rule into a biometric system, whose capability of combating 
corruption helps building legitimacy in the eye of poorer people (Srinivasan & Johri, 2013). 
 
 
5. Image Perception: “Seeing the State” through the Biometric PDS 
 
To complement the perspective of image construction, focus is moved to perception of the state 
through the PDS, as experienced by its beneficiaries. I do so through the narratives collected from 
PDS users in the ration shops, as well as in the multiple settings (self-help organisations, urban 
slums, rural villages) in which extensive interviews with beneficiaries have been conducted. While 
some issues, as illustrated below, are found with particular intensity in specific communities, other 
threads of narrative seem to cut across social groups, revealing common preoccupations for 
recipients in different contexts. Citizens’ voices are integrated with those of the telecentre 
entrepreneurs, ration dealers, and members of PDS staff interviewed across the state. 
 
Speaking to citizens, I have encountered diverse views on the image of the state depicted above. 
Akshaya entrepreneurs concur in reporting high rates of ration card applications performed through 
them, and users often compare the telecentre-based process with the frustration they previously 
experienced in public offices. There could be downsides to the use of telecentres, as IT mediation of 
access to state services may be implemented unevenly across the state, creating new geographies of 
exclusion (Wade, 2002). In addition, telecentre entrepreneurs may be tempted to adopt a logic of 
profit maximisation, which clashes with the objective of social inclusion for which e-kiosks were 
created: implications of moving ration card services to Akshaya centres hence need elaboration.  
 
Akshaya entrepreneurs need some income generation mechanism to ensure sustainability of their 
businesses, as government funding is only disbursed for the set-up phase. Once the telecentre’s 
activity has started, the entrepreneur needs to ensure continuity of the business, providing locally 
relevant content for intended users. To do so, telecentres do not only offer government services, but 
also engage in private activities that can ensure a stream of cash flows, such as courses of computer 
training or access to communication facilities. As a telecentre entrepreneur in Malappuram district 
remarked,  
 
If I do not make a profit, I cannot sustain my business. All the telecentres that failed to understand the 
needs of the people have shut down. 
 
However, a logic of mutual exclusion – in which either the telecentre makes a profit, or it becomes 
able to involve the poor and disadvantaged – is disputed by existing works on Akshaya (Gopakumar, 
2007; Kuriyan & Ray, 2009; Madon, 2005). This is because multiple channels have been established 
to maximise Akshaya’s social inclusion: the project started with an e-literacy phase, in which one 
member for each family was invited to the local telecentre, to attend a course imparting the basics of 
computer usage. Geographic coverage, which places one telecentre at a maximum of 3 km from each 
house, is also functional to accessibility, and so is the role of telecentre entrepreneurs as active 
facilitators of e-services:  
 
Beforehand, it was hard to find information about government schemes. Akshaya entrepreneurs know 
about the schemes, and help people making applications and getting exactly the information they need. 
(Basheer, telecentre user, Malappuram district) 
 
As it emerges from entrepreneurs’ narratives, this is the heart of the training imparted to them by the 
Akshaya project office. Selected among trusted members of their local communities, entrepreneurs 
act as representatives of the state, who make the connection between users’ needs and the novelties 
brought in by information technologies. This is why, when users come in for ration card services, 
telecentre staff guides them through the process, from the documents required to the actual steps of 
the online application. This makes Akshaya centres different from public offices: with the proactive 
presence of trusted facilitators, the project changes the public face of government, ultimately 
determining a positive mechanism of image reconstruction in the eye of citizens (Kuriyan & Ray, 
2009).  
 
But when it comes to the problem-solution nexus, positing Aadhaar as a means to combat the rice 
mafia, users’ narratives reveal a more complex picture. People are found, in particular, to question the 
governments’ arguments on the nature of leakage, and consequently on the technology devised 
against it. The state of Kerala is characterised by high political mobilisation, and trust in government is 
often affected by people’s engagement with politics. In the case of integration of Aadhaar in the PDS, 
there are diverse narratives of suspicion, which cast doubt on the problem-solver’s image that the 
state has constructed for itself. 
 
These narratives have been encountered throughout the whole state, but some groups of citizens 
tend to focus on particular aspects of the problem. One first thread of discourse, found especially in 
rural villages, reveals concern on the practical feasibility of digitisation. It is felt that computerisation of 
ration shops would come under severe predicament if infrastructure could not support it, a problem 
synthesised by a citizen in a rural area of north Kerala: 
 
How will this work? Electricity keeps coming and going. Every now and then, a blackout leaves us without 
light for many hours (…) people have a right to the PDS, and we cannot lose it because of power 
shortages. (Anil, PDS user, Kannur district)  
 
The issue is that with power shortages, or faults in biometric identification, point-of-sale machines 
may not work, and hence the system will end up excluding genuine beneficiaries. This happens in the 
context of a programme that, far from being fully inclusive, already suffers from exclusion errors that 
leave out substantial numbers of households (Khera, 2014; Ramakumar, 2010; Swaminathan, 2008). 
These exclusions are perceived as a serious problem, which needs examination in its own right. 
 The problem of establishing principles for inclusion into social safety nets flows from the move to a 
targeted system, which relegates the PDS to households recognised as below the state-specific 
poverty lines. However as of Swaminathan (2008), households classified as BPL or AAY in all-India 
are just 29.5% of the total, which substantially limits the coverage of food subsidies in a nation already 
suffering from severe hunger and malnutrition. Lists of BPL citizens are capped for each state, and 
their numbers can only be expanded at the expense of local government: there are, beyond this, 
numerous reports of well-off households obtaining BPL cards illegally, to enjoy additional government 
benefits. A PDS user in Malappuram district illustrates the issue: 
 
Irrespective of one’s real status, it is very difficult to be recognised as BPL. Many people in the slums have 
blue cards [APL], but they clearly live in poverty. In the meantime, a lot of rich people get BPL cards out of 
friendship with people in government. (Sheena, PDS user, Perinthalmanna town) 
 
This implies that numerous households, who should be genuinely entitled to the PDS, are left out of it 
by design, and this severely limits the potential of the programme. The problem presented by the 
perverse consequences of targeting is structural, and the solution may need rethinking of programme 
design along lines of greater coverage (Sen & Himanshu, 2011). Diverse measures can be taken to 
improve poverty mapping, and ideas of participatory classification have been experimented with in 
Kerala, resulting in substantial increases in the estimated poverty incidence (Swaminathan, 2002, p. 
51). However these classifications should acknowledge the causes of poverty, and take into account 
social and political factors that they often fail to consider (Williams, Thampi, Narayana, Nandigama, & 
Bhattacharyya, 2012). 
 
In a situation in which many needful households are already excluded from PDS, the preoccupation is 
that Aadhaar may worsen the problem rather than solve it. This is because, in a system affected by 
severe exclusion errors, biometric recognition is tailored to combat the opposite problem, presented 
by the illicit inclusion of non-entitled beneficiaries. While effective in combating inclusion errors, the 
newly computerised technology of rule does not help tackling exclusion of the needful: given the 
depth of this problem, the introduction of Aadhaar recognition may be a suboptimal intervention for 
the PDS (Ramakumar, 2010). The citizens’ voices collected on the field reflect this preoccupation, 
and problematise the image of a successful anti-poverty agent that the state has constructed for itself. 
 
A second problem affects the problem-solution nexus on which the state’s image construction is 
predicated. The government’s assumption, according to which ration dealers are the core guilty part, 
is contested by recipients, who often point to the supply chain agents before ration shops as guilty for 
diversion. This theme cuts across locations and communities, and is often brought up by the food 
security activists and volunteers that work with PDS recipients. In particular, there are concerns with a 
border mafia that subtracts commodities before the AWDs:  
 
A lot of goods are stolen at the border (…) the goods that really get to the shop, and are not sold 
somewhere else, are just a small share. It is easy to say, the ration dealers are causing the system not to 
work, but goods are being stolen during transportation. (Ayesha, PDS user, Malappuram district) 
 
Would there be any corruption, if the private sector was not involved? There are many private companies 
that buy PDS goods, repackage them, and then sell them on the market. Otherwise, the rice mafia could 
not exist. (Rajesh, food security activist, Trivandrum town) 
 
While it is hard to verify these assertions, I could observe that the back-end modules of the software 
(on allocation of goods and inspection monitoring) are still in an early stage of development, and in 
many TSOs they are not used at all. On the one hand, investing in this would probably be less 
popular than acting at the front end, as these modules do not “transform” the ration shop and hence 
do not affect people’s sightings of the state. Still, the current strategy trades visibility for effectiveness, 
as it focuses on the last mile alone rather than on holistic monitoring of the PDS. 
 
Early-stage diversion is reported by many ration dealers, who claim to be systematically unable to lift 
the amount of foodgrains needed to serve all users. Issues raised by ration dealers need to be 
examined in greater detail, as targeting has substantially reduced their customer base. Ration dealers 
discuss the complexities of running a fair-price shop, arguing that their incomes have been 
significantly reduced, undermining the possibility of sustaining their businesses. As noted by one of 
the leaders of the All Kerala Ration Dealers’ Association, it is hard to make a living from a ration shop: 
 
Ration shops (…) are not viable on their own. Many of us have had a shop licence for a very long time, 
and have no chance to learn a new profession. Now [after 1997] things have changed: many customers 
have left the shops (…) many shops have had to close down because of debt. 
 
With the reduction of the state-level PDS supplies to less than 10% of the original amount, the 
average monthly purchase of foodgrains in Kerala diminished from 4.1 kg to 1.8 kg in just five years 
(Khera 2011b: 107). The drastic reduction in offtake is the heart of the problem, and market diversion 
is often presented, even by ration dealers themselves, as the only viable solution for PDS shops to 
survive. As noted by a fair-price shop owner in one of Trivandrum’s slums: 
 
We get a commission on the goods we sell, but that is very low. We are left alone with our shops, not 
knowing how to even cover our expenses. (Chaitram, ration dealer, Chenkalchoola slum) 
 
Reflecting the point of view of ration dealers, these narratives put the problem in a more complete 
perspective. Engagement with black market networks is still deplorable, and actively contributes to 
impeding poor people to access the food items to which they are entitled. At the same time, the root 
cause of the problem is ascribed to a perverse consequence of targeting: ration dealers’ voices reveal 
the unsustainable conditions of their shops, and often end up pointing to the stories of those who 
committed suicide as a result of debt. Aadhaar monitoring may prevent shop owners from cheating, 
but its effect is limited without real alternatives for them to become capable to make a living. 
 Finally, a third stream of narrative reveals what is perhaps the most profound cause for citizens’ 
concern. Backed by reforms envisaged at the national level, the adoption of biometrics is related to 
the incoming shift to a cash transfers system, which if implemented would dismantle the PDS at its 
very roots. While there is consensus on this at the government level, citizens across the state present 
a more complex picture: 
 
Aadhaar will make cash transfers mandatory for everyone. This is very difficult for the poor, who may have 
never used a bank at all. (Swetha, PDS user, Malappuram district)  
 
The real problem with Aadhaar (…) will be in the long term. Since people can use every ration shop, ration 
dealers will not know how many customers they have, and so they will not be able to require the right 
amount [of foodgrains]. The only way is giving licences to grocery shops (…) the PDS will disappear, and 
people will have to use the market. (Rajesh, food security activist, Trivandrum district) 
 
Fears of exclusion of the poor, lack of protection from inflation, and lack of familiarity of vulnerable 
groups with banking systems are the main practical concerns surrounding a shift to cash transfers. 
These need to be added to political understandings of the shift, based on the unwanted involvement 
of the market in a system that was isolated from it since the beginning. Citizens’ surveys conducted 
across India reveal strong preference for the current PDS, as compared to a potential move to a cash 
transfer system (e.g. Aggarwal, 2011; Puri, 2012; Khera, 2014). As it is widely feared, a shift to cash 
transfers could exacerbate the exclusion error initiated with the move to a targeted PDS. 
 
It is this last thread of narrative that now matters most directly. The narratives presented here were 
collected before a new national government, led by Narendra Modi’s National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA), openly voiced the intention to replace the PDS with cash transfers, and envisaged operational 
measures to conduct the shift. To do so, Aadhaar is being combined with a financial inclusion 
programme (Jan Dhan Yojana) and mobile technologies: Jan Dhan Yojana aims at providing each 
household with a bank account, which will be the backbone infrastructure to transfer benefits to those 
entitled. The combination of Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar and mobile payments, acronymised as “JAM 
trinity” in the governments’ narrative, is being planned with the explicit purpose of rebuilding the 
nation’s anti-poverty system, by converting existing subsidies into a lump-sum transfer to the BPL 
(Government of India, 2015). People’s concerns with this move, and with the implications of the end 
of the PDS, should be taken into account as policy decisions are made.7 
 
Overall, narrative analysis has hence revealed deep asymmetries between the government’s 
perspective and citizens’ appraisal of the biometric PDS. As illustrated, the government depicts 
biometric technology as the key to combating the rice mafia, by monitoring all the transactions 
                                                          
7 To be sure, this does not imply that cash transfer programmes are per se ineffective or biased. For example, 
Aker et al. (2015) demonstrate that transfers enabled by mobile money can work as effective instruments of 
social protection. The problem voiced by recipients is not with the JAM project in itself, but with the implications 
that a shift from the PDS would have on their access to food security entitlements.  
conducted by ration dealers. At the same time, many PDS users dispute this view, as not only does 
Aadhaar monitor the supply chain only partially, but its architecture actually prepares a policy shift 
which will dismantle the PDS as it is currently known. The image of a skilled problem-solver, which the 
state has constructed for itself, is not taken at face value, as citizens do not “see the state” through it, 
but through the effects of technology on their entitlements within the PDS.  
 
Finally, lessons drawn from the case go beyond explication of the role of technology in streamlining 
anti-poverty systems. What is suggested, depicting Aadhaar as a potential means to shift to cash 
transfers, is the inscription of a political agenda in technology, as cash transfers yield a view of anti-
poverty nets which involves the market rather than excluding it. A shift to cash transfers is a likely 
evolution of India’s food security policy, and biometric architectures constitute the backbone of the 
“JAM trinity” at the basis of change. The reform potential of biometric architectures seems therefore 
deep enough to enable radical reconstruction of the anti-poverty system. 
 
 
6. Lessons and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, based on a case of computerisation in the Kerala PDS, I have studied the effects of 
incorporation of digital architectures in anti-poverty programmes. Field narratives reveal that on the 
one hand, the state constructs the biometric infrastructure of Aadhaar as the ideal means to combat 
diversion from the PDS. On the other hand, this is disputed by users, in that technology is seen by 
many as exclusionary, over-focused on ration dealers, and oriented to the elimination of PDS in 
favour of cash transfers. The power of technology, in reconstructing the state’s image, seems 
therefore to be limited by the real-life encounters of citizens with the PDS. 
 
As biometric technologies are increasingly being adopted in anti-poverty nets worldwide, these 
findings have two main implications. First, Corbridge et al. show how poorer citizens “see the state” 
through encounters with it, based on anti-poverty technologies of rule. As these are augmented by 
biometric architectures, this fosters an active role of the state in image-building: as image formation is 
structured through encounters between state and citizens, biometric recognition is used to reconstruct 
exactly these encounters, as it does with ration shop transactions in the PDS. This feeds into citizens’ 
sightings of the state, and enables governments to reinvent themselves as skilled problem-solvers. 
 
Second, narrative analysis has highlighted that citizens re-elaborate, and sometimes dispute, the new 
images of the state rebuilt through biometrics. This is how the same technology, allegedly constructed 
to combat illegal diversion of PDS goods, comes to be perceived as exclusionary, mistargeted, and  
finalised to a largely unwanted shift from PDS to cash transfers. This depicts technology as the carrier 
of a policy agenda, which if implemented may significantly rebuild the existing reality of anti-poverty 
structures. The potential of biometrics therefore goes beyond reinvention of the state’s image, and 
extends to the actual reconstruction of anti-poverty systems. 
 At the time of writing, the central government’s intention of shifting from the PDS to cash transfers 
based on the JAM trinity has been declared, but not translated into action. If the policy shift is made, 
biometric authentication will be used to identify recipients, and to enable transfers of subsidy money 
to their bank accounts. While this would dismantle the existing PDS supply chains, in which the rice 
mafia networks proliferate, the concerns presented here remain: a well-functioning banking 
infrastructure, coupled with protection against price volatility and mechanisms to avoid exclusion of 
beneficiaries, are points that a valid cash transfers programme will need to include. Absence of any of 
these may result in malfunctioning that would perpetuate the errors made with the PDS.  
 
In particular, the main limitation of JAM emerging here is its focus on tackling inclusion errors, when 
the problem of the PDS is found chiefly in the massive exclusion of genuinely needful users. A move 
to cash transfers would not augment the system’s coverage, and that leaves untouched the problem 
of the many vulnerable households left out from social protection. The risk of further exclusion, due to 
issues with implementation of electronic infrastructure and low familiarity with banking systems, would 
actually worsen the problem, potentially leaving more households unable to access the subsidies to 
which they are entitled. While cash transfer programmes have been successful elsewhere, this 
specific transition seems risky, and reasons for preoccupation often surface when citizens discuss it. 
 
At the same time, the national landscape shows signs of improvement for PDS reform. At the state 
level, interventions towards a more inclusive PDS are becoming frequent: in addition to Tamil Nadu, 
Andhra and Himachal Pradesh have moved to a quasi-universal system, and the coverage of BPL 
lists has been expanded in many states (Khera, 2014). These interventions are accompanied by the 
approval on September 12, 2013, of the National Food Security Act (NFSA), which gives 67% of the 
Indian population legal rights over a uniform quantity of 5 kg of foodgrains, to be made available at a 
fixed price of Rs.1-3 per kg through ration shops. The common denominator of these interventions is 
that of making the PDS more inclusive, reducing prices of access and increasing entitled quantities. 
 
Should the central government decide to preserve the PDS and combat leakage through incremental 
reforms, at least two types of intervention will be needed. First, holistic monitoring should be preferred 
to sheer focus on ration shops, which are only one stage of the programme’s supply chain. Front-end 
interventions on anti-poverty systems may well be more popular, as they affect the physical loci of 
image formation for citizens, as opposed to the back-end measures that citizens cannot really see. 
Yet at the same time, failure to address supply chains in their early stages may easily result in 
persistence of leakage, as it leaves a substantial part of the problem untouched. 
 
Second, while monitoring ration dealers is important, the current system still sees them struggling with 
the threat of unviability induced by the targeted PDS. Interventions to monitor them, such as Aadhaar-
based point-of-sale machines, are to be combined with policy measures that remove their incentive to 
diversion. At the state level, the Kerala government has already taken some steps in this direction, by 
giving credit concessions to ration dealers and allowing them to sell commodities outside the PDS. 
The nation-wide NFSA, which will expand the customer basis of ration dealers, will be a significant 
improvement in this respect. 
 
At present, biometric architectures are reshaping anti-poverty programmes worldwide, a phenomenon 
epitomised by the case presented here. I hope to have contributed, with this paper, to understanding 
their role in reconstructing the anti-poverty systems through which many citizens, subjected to their 
functioning, still “see the state” in most of the world. 
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